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THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: PRODUCT LIABILITY
OR ONE HELL OF A NUISANCE?
Kristen S. Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical companies have received heavy scrutiny in the news
lately for their pricing tactics and hand in the opioid epidemic.1 For
example, Time, The Atlantic, Fortune, and CBS have all published negative
articles regarding the unnecessary hiking of drug prices.2 Even before the
judgment against Purdue Pharmaceutical for their part in the opioid
epidemic, public perception of the pharmaceutical industry and their
manufacturing of opioid-based medication was negative.3 An article in
Vox described pharmaceutical company efforts at successfully enticing
doctors to prescribe opioids.4 After Purdue Pharmaceuticals and other
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers were found liable for part of the opioid
epidemic, public perception praised the Judge for finally punishing the
* Kristen S. Jones is a 2021 graduate of Mississippi College School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor Mark Modak-Truran for his advice throughout
the drafting of this Comment. The author is also grateful to her friends and family for
their support.
1. See Justin McCarthy, Big Pharma Sinks to the Bottom of U.S. Industry
Rankings, GALLUP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/266060/big-pharmasinks-bottom-industry-rankings.aspx.
2. See Laura Entis, Why Does Medicine Cost So Much? Here’s How Drug
Prices Are Set, TIME (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5564547/drug-prices-medicine/;
See also Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices
Doesn’t Add Up, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-cost-research-anddevelopment/585253/; See Chris Morris, Big Pharma Raised Prices of Several
Prescription Drugs on First Day of 2020, FORTUNE (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://fortune.com/2020/01/02/prescription-drug-price-increase-2020/; see also Megan
Cerullo, 2020 is three days old and drug prices are already jumping, CBS NEWS (Jan. 3,
2020),, 5:17 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/big-pharma-companies-raised-priceson-more-than-400-drugs-to-start-2020/.
3. See Domenica Ghanem, You Want to Kill Drug Dealers, Start with Big
Pharma, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://ips-dc.org/want-killdrug-dealers-start-big-pharma/.
4. German Lopez, Drug Companies Bought Doctors Fancy Meals – And Then
Those Doctors Prescribed More Opioids, VOX (May 15, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/5/15/17355722/opioid-epidemic-doctorpharma-insys.
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companies responsible for the opioid epidemic.5 The high tensions and
negative perception towards the pharmaceutical industry have led to
lawsuits against private individuals for their association and involvements
with such companies.6
In 2017, there were more than 191 million opioid prescriptions.7
One in four patients that receive pro-longed opioid treatment will struggle
with addiction.8 Two out of three drug overdose deaths involve an opioid.9
Since the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies have continuously
downplayed the addictive nature of opioids.10 Out of 700,000 overdose
deaths, roughly 68% are due to overdoses involving opioids.11
Approximately 130 individuals die each day from opioids.12 From 2015
through 2018, the opioid epidemic has cost the United States approximately
$631 billion in association with addiction.13 Of the $631 billion, roughly
$205 billion is spent on healthcare, $253 billion on premature deaths, $49
billion associated with crime, $39 billion associated with childcare, and
approximately $96 billion arises from a loss in productivity.14
Opioids are prescribed to treat moderate-to-severe pain.15 Risks
associated with prescription opioids include “misuse, addiction, overdose,
5. See Chris McGreal, Capitalism Gone Wrong: How Big Pharma Created
America’s Opioid Carnage, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/24/opioids-crisis-big-pharma-drugscarnage.
6. Charles W. Van Way, III, Bashing Big Pharma, US NAT’L LIBRARY OF
MEDICINE NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Mar.-Apr. 2019),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6461324/.
7. 2018 Annual Surveillance Report of Drug-Related Risks and Outcomes,
CDC (Aug. 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drugsurveillance-report.pdf. https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drugsurveillance-report.pdf?s_cid=cs_828.
8. Addiction and Overdose, CDC (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/prescribed.html.
9. H. Hedgegaard, AM. Miniño & M. Warner, Drug Overdose Deaths in the
United States, 1999-2017, CDC (Nov. 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db329.htm.
10. What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic, HHS (Sept. 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html.
11. Understanding the Epidemic, CDC (Dec. 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html.
12. Id.
13. Stoddard Davenport, Alexandra Weaver, Matt Caverly, Economic Impact
of Non-Medical Opioid Use in the United States, Mortality and Longevity, SOCIETY OF
ACTUARIES (Oct. 2019), https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/researchreport/2019/econ-impact-non-medical-opioid-use.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Prescription Opioids, CDC (Aug. 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/prescribed.html.
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and death, especially with long term use.”16 Currently, opioids are a
controlled substance and are a schedule II drug.17 Schedule II drugs include
any medication that has “a high potential for abuse.”18 Any individual that
wishes to manufacture or distribute any controlled substances must register
with the Attorney General.19 All manufacturers and distributors of
controlled substances must also comply with the labeling and packaging
requirements under applicable federal and state laws.20
Due to the opioid epidemic, the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services outlined a five-point plan to combat emerging issues
which includes “(1) improving access to treatment and recovery services;
(2) promoting use of overdose-reversing drugs; (3) strengthening our
understanding of the epidemic through better public health surveillance; (4)
providing support for cutting edge research on pain and addiction; and (5)
advancing better practices for pain management.”21
This Comment argues that the judgment in State v. Purdue
Pharmaceuticals was incorrect in holding defendants liable under the
doctrine of public nuisance and should, therefore, be vacated. First, as to
the judgment, the Judge expanded the definition of a public right beyond its
traditional scope without cause, the Judge incorrectly applied the theory of
proximate cause, and the Judge was likely persuaded by public perception
in his ruling. Second, the doctrine of public nuisance should not expand
into the realm of product liability instead of using traditional doctrines
aimed at consumer protection, such as product liability or negligence.
Third, the legislature should enact new consumer protection laws to protect
consumers from pharmaceutical companies that act egregiously.
In State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, the Court held defendants
liable for false and misleading advertising associated with the
manufacturing, promoting, and selling of opioid-based drugs.22 It found
the plaintiff, Oklahoma, experienced significant harm associated with
opioid addiction through the costs of services.23 Further, the Court found
that the defendants willfully understated the consequences of opioid-based
16. Prescription Opioid: Overview, CDC (Nov. 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing/overview.html.
17. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(2) (West 2018).
18. Id.
19. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822(a)(2) (West 2018); 21 U.S.C.A. § 823(a) (West 2018).
20. 21 U.S.C.A. § 825 (West 2018).
21. Thomas E. Price, Secretary Price Announces HHS Strategy for Fighting
Opioid Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2017-speeches/secretary-priceannounces-hhs-strategy-for-fighting-opioid-crisis/index.html.
22. State v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12
(Dist. Ct. Okla. Aug. 26, 2019).
23. Pardue Phrama LP., 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21.
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drugs, broadened product distribution, took data out of context, and actively
promoted opioid-based medication in contrast to company policy. 24
The proceeding section will provide a brief historical development
of public nuisance law. Next, this paper will discuss the procedural history,
facts, and the judgment in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals. Subsequently,
this Comment will apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the facts of
this case. This Comment will then compare the facts and holding in State
v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals with similar cases regarding product liability
claims under the theory of public nuisance. Thereafter, this Comment will
discuss the possible rationales behind the judgment. Lastly, this Comment
will provide a summary of possible consequences that may occur as a result
of the extension.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
Traditionally, the scope of public nuisance was connected to the
infringement of public rights or in connection to land.25 The purpose of
public nuisance is to deter activities that are harmful to the community.26
Public nuisance is typically considered with but not limited to “interference
with the public health, … public safety, … public morals, … [and] public
peace.”27
Historically, courts rarely used the doctrine of public nuisance for
criminal liability because it was reserved for limited circumstances
involving the interference of public or royal rights.28 Anonymous expanded
the doctrine of public nuisance beyond a cause of action for monarchies to
encompass private individuals and suggested that public nuisances must
cause specific harm for an individual to have standing with the claim.29
In the 1536 case of Anonymous, the plaintiff, a property owner,
brought suit against the defendant for blocking the king’s highway.30 The
court held that allowing suits for any individual harmed under the doctrine
of public nuisance would open the floodgates of litigation.31 Therefore,
24. Id. at *11.
25. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 86 at 617-18 (5th ed.
1984).
26. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821 (B) (Am.
Law Inst. 1979).
28. Reynolds, Osborne N. Jr., Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 Okla.
L. Rev. 318, 319 (1978) (citing E Garrett & H. Garrett, Nuisances (4d ed. 1908)).
29. Anon., Y.B. Mich., 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1536) (Eng.), reprinted in
History and Sources of the Common Law 98 (1970).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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only individuals who have suffered a special or unique harm different from
others may have standing to bring a claim under the doctrine of public
nuisance.32 The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s use of the road was
unique and that he suffered more significant harm than the average
individual using the road.33 Thus, he was permitted to bring this nuisance
action against the defendant because the roadblock uniquely harmed the
plaintiff.34
Since Anonymous, the doctrine of public nuisance has commonly
been used in cases for obstruction of highways or waterways and noise
violations.35 For example, an action for public nuisance was brought
against railroad companies alleging that the railroad created dangerous
conditions for individuals that wished to travel the road alongside the
tracks.36 The court found the railroad companies not liable under the
doctrine of public nuisance for the risk of harm associated with traveling
alongside the track.37 They reasoned that legislative authorization and
compliance shield companies from public nuisance so long as they are
compliant with the applicable law.38 The court found the railroad
companies not liable based on legislative approval to operate the railroad.39
However, more recently, public nuisance has been used for claims
involving environmental grievances, banking, and product liability
claims.40
The current elements of public nuisance include (1) standing, (2)
public right, (3) a substantial and unreasonable interference with that right
by the defendant, and (4) proximate cause.41
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. c.
(Am. Law. Inst. 1979).
36. Bordentown & S.A. Turnpike Road v. Camden & A.R. &. Transp. Co., 17
N.J.L. 314, 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1839).
37. Id. at 320-21.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 319-20.
40. Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004); Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F. 3d 503, 505 (7th
Cir. 1996); City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 497-99 (6th
Cir. 2010).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B).).) (Am.
Law. Inst. 1979). Proximate cause is added under case law and recognized in the notes of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts but not in the elements of the rule. The proceeding
case explicitly recognized proximate cause as an element of public nuisance: Burns v.
Simon Properties Group, LLP, 996 N.E. 2d 1208, 1212 (Ill. 2013). For clarity, the
analysis section will further breakdown each element of public nuisance into smaller
“sub-categories.”
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual must
have standing to recover for injuries sustained by a public nuisance.42 The
injury suffered must be “of a kind different from that suffered by other
members of the public exercising the right common to the general public
that was the subject of interference.”43 Furthermore, private individuals or
statutorily approved government entities or officials may bring suits for
public nuisance.44
Under the doctrine of public nuisance, the injury must occur while
exercising a public right.45 According to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, “a public right is one common to all members of the general public.
It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has
not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.”46
Once a public right or an exception has been established, the
doctrine of public nuisance requires that interference with the public right
to be unreasonable and significant.47 Unreasonable interference may be
intentional or unintentional actions by the defendant.48 In addition, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a list of interferences that might be
unreasonable.49 When a defendant acts intentionally to interfere with an
individual’s public right or if there is a high probability of interference, then
the defendant’s actions are unreasonable.50 However, even if an
individuals’ actions were intentional, then the court must consider the
potential benefits, costs, and harms associated with the defendant’s
actions.51 In contrast to intentional interference, if the action that harms a
public right was unintentional, then the court will consider if the

42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC
Nuisance § 821(C) cmt. c, (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC
NUISANCE § 821(C) (Am. Law. Inst. 1979).
44. Id.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am.
Law. Inst. 1979).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. g.
(Am. Law Inst. 1979)
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law
Inst. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts: Significant Harm § 821(F) (Am. Law Inst.
1979).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
49. Id.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL INVASION – WHAT
CONSTITUTES § 825 (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law
Inst. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g, (Am. Law
Inst. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: § 826 (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
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interference was due to other actionable torts, such as negligence.52
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual is negligent
if they act or fail to act regarding a duty and said action or inaction falls
below a reasonable standard of care designed to protect others from an
unreasonable risk of harm.53 Furthermore, a defendant may be negligent
for failing to warn an individual of the potential harm.54
After an interference has been established, the court must consider
if such interference was significant.55 Almost all activities can interfere,
harm, or annoy those in society.56 The significance of the harm must be
objectively determined considering all relevant factors.57

52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE DEFINED § 282 cmt. a-e,
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). Case law suggests that a finding of negligence requires that the
defendant owed a duty of care to the public and that the defendant breached said public
duty by failing to maintain a reasonable standard of care. N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Typically, in determining whether a duty
exists, courts “balance … foreseeability, public policy, and the relationship between the
parties. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222, 1242
(Ind. 2003); see also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E. 2d 1099, 1125
(Ill. 2004). However, the balancing test is only required if the law has not yet established
such a duty by law. Id. The instant case, State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, pertains to
public nuisance in the context of manufacturing opioid-based medications. Therefore, we
will consider the duties that pharmaceutical companies owe. In Oklahoma,
pharmaceutical manufacturers only owe a duty to the prescribers. Edwards v. Basel
Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997). Their duty to prescribers only requires
that they disclose any of the potential side effects or risks associated with the use of their
products. Id. New York and Florida impose similar duties on pharmaceutical companies.
See Amos v. Biogen Idec Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 164, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 2015); see also
Levine v. Wyeth Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN § 18
(Am. Law Inst. 2010). In context to the instant case, State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals,
pharmaceutical companies have a general duty to warn consumers of potential risks
associated with the use of medication when required by the FDA or when other
exceptions have been identified by law. Edwards, 933 P.2d 298, 301-02. However,
compliance with the FDA is not a shield from liability and a mere minimum duty that
must be met. Id. at 303. Therefore, states may impose heightened duties on
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Id.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e
(Am. Law Inst. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SIGNIFICANT HARM § 821(F)
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GRAVITY OF HARM – FACTORS § 827
cmt., b, (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
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Proximate cause has been interpreted to include cause in fact and
legal cause.58 Cause in fact requires that there be “a reasonable certainty
that a defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.”59 In contrast to cause
in fact, legal cause “addresses the separate issue of how far legal
responsibility should extend for a party’s actions.”60 An individual is the
legal cause of harm if their conduct “is a substantial factor in producing the
injury.”61 See footnote 62 for notes on the Restatement (Second) of Tort’s
approach to proximate cause.62 The purpose of proximate cause is to limit
liability to injuries that are foreseeable as a result of a tortfeasor’s actions.63
The Supreme Court of the United States has suggested that “proximate
cause reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient.’”64 A defendant is the proximate cause of an
injury when their actions, “in a natural and continuous sequence [resulting
58. Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004) (citing Lee v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 605 N.E. 2d 492, 502 (Ill. 1992)); see also Ashley County,
Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F. 3d 659, 667 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Chambers v. Stern, 64
S.W. 3d 737, 744 (Ark. 2002)).
59. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (citing Lee, 605 N.E. 2d 493, 502). As put
by the Supreme Court of Missouri, legal cause turns on whether the “harm is the
reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.” City of St. Louis v.
Benjamin Moore &. Co., 226 S.W. 3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007). Therefore, had the tortfeasor
not acted, then the harm would not have occurred. Id. at 114; see also Jones, 155 P.3d 9,
14-15. The Supreme Court of Ohio provided factors to consider when determining the
remoteness of harm from the alleged conduct. Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768
N.E.2d 1136, 1152 (Ohio 2002) (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
503 U.S. 248, 269 (2002)). First, a court must consider whether the injury was direct or
indirect. Id. Second, if a court must employ complicated or burdensome rules to
determine if the injury was direct, then the injury was likely indirect. Id. Third, was the
injured party directly or indirectly related to the conduct. Id.
60. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (citing See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on
Torts § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W. 3d 110, 114
(citing Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W. 3d 852, 856 (Mo. 1993)).
61. People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th51, 103 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2017) (citing Soule v. General Motors Corp, 8 Cal. 4th 548, 572 (Cal. 1994)).
62. The restatement, in contrast to cases, uses the term “legal cause” instead of
proximate cause. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR
TORTIOUS CONDUCT § 29 cmt. a-b, (Am. Law Inst. 2010). Proximate cause includes
cause in fact and legal cause. The restatement’s approach to legal cause satisfies both the
common law definition of cause in fact and legal cause. Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS: LEGAL CAUSE; WHAT CONSTITUTES § 431 cmt. a-d, (Am. Law Inst. 1934).
Therefore, although citing cases, this is not inconsistent with the restatement. Instead,
this is to assist readers in providing familiar terms that are utilized in cases.
63. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mendoza
v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
64. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 502 US. 258, 268 (2002) (citing W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 41 p.
264 (5th ed. 1984)).
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from their actions], unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”65 A
plaintiff who cannot establish some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged fails to plead a key element for
establishing proximate causation, independent of and in addition to other
traditional elements of proximate cause.66 However, an intervening act
may shield an individual from liability if such an act is “sufficient to stand
as the cause of the injury” and the intervening act is “totally independent”
of the original act.67
A. Public Nuisance: Environmental
Historically, environmental claims have been brought based on
noxious odors, pollution, and water contamination.68 Public nuisance was
the basis for creating and determining the scope of many environmental
statutory regimes.69 For example, Congress used public nuisance as a basis
in The Clean (§ 503) Air Act, Water Pollution Control Act (7003), The
Clean Water Act (§ 504).70 Furthermore, some statutes share the same
purpose of public nuisance, protecting individuals and govern behavior.71
B. Public Nuisance: Banking
In recent years, the doctrine of public nuisance has been used
against banks for their part in the subprime mortgage crisis.72 For example,
in the City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. Securities, Inc., Cleveland
brought suit against financial institutions claiming that their part in the

65. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 666 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing City of Caddo Valley v.
George, 340 Ark. 203, 9 S.W.3d 481, 487 (2000)).
66. Id.
67. Caddo Valley, 9 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Hill Constr. Co. v. Bragg, 725
S.W. 2d 538, 540 (Ark. 1987)); see also Ashley, 552 F. 3d 659, 667.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. g
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
69. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution:
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1J.L. Econ. & Org. 313, 315 (1985).
70. S. REP. 96-172. 96th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1979, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019,
1979 WL 10338 (Leg. Hist.)
71. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps. of
Eng’rs, 101 F. 3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1996).
72. Richard E. Gottlieb, Andrew J. McGuinness, Subprime Lending As A
Public Nuisance: Casting Blame Mortgage On Lenders And Wall Street For Inner City
Blight, 62 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 4 (2008).
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subprime mortgage crisis constituted a public nuisance.73 The plaintiff
contended that the defendant’s part in creating subprime mortgages, with
their relaxed lending standards, was not the sole but a partial cause of the
crisis, which constituted a public nuisance.74 The alleged harm was an
increase in societal costs due to foreclosures, loss in property tax,
unemployment, and lower innovation.75 The court was unpersuaded by the
plaintiff’s argument because the harm alleged was also due to a multitude
of factors all outside the bank’s control.76 For example, the court found that
homeowners applied for and defaulted on their loans by their own
volition.77 Moreover, the defendants engaged in statutorily legal activities
and did not partake in any illegal activities.78 Therefore, defendants were
not the proximate cause of the harm and could not be held liable for the
public nuisance.79
C. Public Nuisance: Class Actions
In addition to municipalities and private individuals bringing claims
under the doctrine of public nuisance, groups of individuals have attempted
to assert class actions under the doctrine. The plaintiffs, in Diamond v.
General Motors, comprised of over seven thousand Los Angeles residence,
brought a class-action for discharging harmful pollutants into the
atmosphere against numerous defendants on public nuisance grounds as
well as others.80 The court dismissed the class-action claim for public
nuisance because it would unreasonably complicate the litigation, each
party has suffered different harm, and that each member would have a
separate interest in this litigation.81 Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to assert
any specific injury that prevented them from enjoying the use of their
property.82 Therefore, the class action was denied.83

73. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 498-99
(6th Cir. 2010).
74. Id. at 499.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 505.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 505.
79. Id. at 506-07.
80. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 377 (2nd Cir.
1971).
81. Id.at 377-78.
82. Id. at 378.
83. Id. at 383.

42

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39:1

D. Public Nuisance: Product Liability
Historically, the purpose of product liability was to hold
manufacturers liable for defective products.84 In order to bring a claim for
product liability it had to be founded on negligence.85 Product liability
claims are brought because of “defects, design defects, and defects based
on inadequate instructions or warnings.”86 Beginning around the 1970s, the
doctrine of public nuisance became a popular mode to litigate product
liability claims.87 When product liability claims are brought under the
doctrine of public nuisance, there are four general themes: (1) at the time
of sale, the product was legally manufactured and; (2) at the time of sale,
the product was non-defective; (3) after the sale, the harm was indirectly
caused by an individual other than the manufacturer; and (4) after the sale,
the manufacturer or distributor had relinquished control of the product.88
Public nuisance in product liability has been prevalent for quite some
time.89 Product liability claims have commonly been brought under the
doctrine of public nuisance regarding the tobacco industry, lead paint
industry, firearm industry, and, more recently, the pharmaceutical
industry.90
1. Public Nuisance: Tobacco
In 1998, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S.
territories reached a settlement agreement with cigarette manufacturers
concerning Medicaid lawsuits.91 The basis for the litigation was that
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR
DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1998).
85. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71
U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2003) (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051
(N.Y. 1916)). See also the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF
COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS §
1 cmt. a, that further suggests warranty actions could be brought as well.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR
DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTs § 1 cmt. a.
87. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71
U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2003).
88. See Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla.
2003); see also Ashley County, Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 673 (8th Cir. 2009);
see State of Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
89. See Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Ashley,
552 F.3d at 673; see American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
90. See Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Ashley,
552 F.3d 659, 673; see American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960. Id.
91. Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State
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cigarette manufacturers caused an increase in medical costs for smokingrelated illnesses.92
Prior to the 1998 settlement agreement, Texas partially litigated a
case against cigarette manufacturers under the doctrine of public nuisance.
In 1997, Texas brought suit against the American tobacco company for the
increased cost in the state Medicaid program, alleging that tobacco products
directly caused an increase in costs associated with healthcare.93 The
district court dismissed the Texas’ claim as to public nuisance because they
failed to prove how the tobacco companies harmed the state by “improperly
us[ing] their own property, or that the state itself has been injured in its use
or employment of its property.”94 Shortly thereafter, the settlement
agreement was signed.95
2. Public Nuisance: Lead Paint
Up until 1978, lead-based paint was heavily used in residential
areas. The use of lead-based paint ended because lead exposure is highly
toxic to both children and adults.97 Public nuisance claims against lead
paint manufacturers were generally sought because of the cost to remove
lead-based paint and because of increased healthcare costs due to the
harmful effects on children that were exposed to lead-based paint.98
In the case of In re Lead Paint Litigation, numerous cities sued lead
paint manufacturers, alleging increased cost in removing lead-based paint,
healthcare cost to those exposed, and educating residents on the harmful
effects of lead.99 The court held that plaintiffs failed to identify a unique
harm from the lead paint other than “those arising from the common
right.”100 The court reasoned that a finding of liability would expand public
96

Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA Proceeds 25 A.L.R.6th
435 (Originally published in 2007).
92. Id.
93. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960.
94. Id. at 973.
95. Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State
Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R.6th
435 (Originally published in 2007).
96. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prod. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 73 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017)
97. Id. at 79.
98. See Id. at 79; see also In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 487 (N.J.
2007).
99. In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d at 487.
100. Id. at 502.
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nuisance so far that it may never stop and would “devour in one gulp the
entire law of tort.” 101
In 1999, the Attorney General of Rhode Island brought an action for
public nuisance against lead paint manufacturers.102 Their main contention
was that lead paint manufacturers concealed and misrepresented the
harmful effects of lead exposure, which ultimately led to a public health
crisis from said exposure.103 Lead poisoning was deemed a public health
crisis due to its permanent and detrimental effect on childhood
development.104 Due to the harmful effects of lead-based paint, Congress
and state legislature banned the use of lead-based products and
implemented educational programs to discuss the harm of exposure.105 The
court held that the harm caused by lead paint and the impacts it had on
individuals was not a public right.106 To satisfy the public right requirement
under the doctrine of public nuisance, the plaintiff must provide more than
a general interference with “health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience.”107 Without a public right, an individual will not be liable
even if their actions were unreasonable.108 The court furthered its rationale
on public policy. First, the expansion of public nuisance would be “bad
law” and result in the “worst sort of tyranny.”109 Second, if the court were
to expand the doctrine of public nuisance, then it would surpass the intended
scope of the doctrine.110
By contrast, in People v. ConAgra, lead paint manufacturers were
held liable for all injuries sustained as a result of their harmful marketing
tactics. 111 In this case, California sued lead paint manufacturers, alleging
that their promoting and manufacturing of lead paint constituted a public
nuisance.112 In extending public nuisance to product liability, the court
further stated that a claim for public nuisance based on a product does not
require the defendant to have full control of the product up until the

101. Id. at 505 (citing Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta,
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
102. Id. at 439-40.
103. Id. at 440.
104. State v. Lead Industries, Ass’n, Inc., 951 A. 2d 428, 436-37 (R.I. 2008).
105. Id. at 438.
106. Id. at 453.
107. Id. at 453-54.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 454. (citing Edmund Burke, The Works of Edmund Burke: With a
Memoir 318 (1860)).
110. Id. at 453-54
111. People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 166-69
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
112. Id. at 79.
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injury.113 In addition, the court extended public rights to issues that impact
societal interests at large and found that children have a right to be free from
lead-based paint in their homes.114 The court held that lead paint
manufacturers knew of the risks associated with the use of lead paint and
still promoted and sold their product for residential purposes.115 A
nuisance, in California, only requires that the defendant be culpable in
creating a hazardous condition.116 Ultimately, the defendants created a
public nuisance by failing to warn of the hazardous effects of lead-based
paint.117
3. Public Nuisance: Firearm
In 2017, approximately 39,773 people died from firearm-related
injuries in the United States.118 The firearm industry is heavily regulated.119
Even with such regulations, there are still casualties of violence and
accidents. As a result of a slew of lawsuits against firearm manufacturers,
in 2005 Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
to shield gun manufacturers from liability in instances where their products
are misused or used for any unlawful purposes.120
In Ileto v. Glock, the plaintiffs, parents of the deceased, sued gun
manufacturers under the doctrine of public nuisance.121 Ileto argued that
gun manufacturers interfered with public safety and health in the production
and promotion of firearms.122 The court held that the families of the victims
suffered an injury that was “different in kind from the general public.”123
The court additionally found that the manufacturers were the proximate
cause of the injuries and death suffered by the victims because the
manufacturers fostered an “illegal secondary market that foreseeably led to
a prohibited purchase.”124 The court further stated that products might be
113. Id. at 163.
114. Id. at 112.
115. Id. at 168.
116. Id. at 163.
117. Id. at 166.
118. Pew Res. Ctr. What the Data Says About Gun Deaths in the U.S., (Aug.
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/16/what-the-data-says-about-gundeaths-in-the-u-s/.
119. § 7901. Findings; purposes, 15 U.S.C.A. §7901(a)(4) (Westlaw though
P.L. 116-158)
120. Id. at §7901(b)(1)
121. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 421 F.
Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
122. Id. at 1211.
123. Id. at 1212.
124. Id. at 1213.
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the cause of a public nuisance if said products “unreasonably interfere with
a right common to the general public.”125 However, on remand, the district
court dismissed Ileto’s claim and held that legislative intent would not
permit recovery on public nuisance grounds.126
A similar conclusion was reached in the City of Philadelphia v.
Baretta U.S.A. Corp, where the City of Philadelphia sued gun
manufacturers on public nuisance grounds, alleging that the use of
defendants’ products by criminals resulted in an increased cost to protecting
the public.127 First, the court noted that no prior New Jersey court had held
lawful activities in commerce to be a public nuisance.128 Furthermore,
public rights were typically limited to “interference connected with real
property or infringement of public rights.”129 Moreover, the court found
that the causal connection between an increased cost in preventing crime
and the manufacturing was too attenuated to hold the defendants liable
because they had no direct control over the firearms.130 Thus, the court
ultimately declined to extend New Jersey law and chose not to hold a
firearm manufacturer legal for harm caused indirectly by defendants.131
In Young v. Bryce Arms, on a motion for summary judgment, the
court reached comparable conclusions as in the City of Philadelphia and
Ileto.132 Ultimately, the court dismissed claims against gun manufacturers,
which alleged that they created a public nuisance by selling firearms that
were used in furtherance of criminal activities.133 In Young, five plaintiffs
comprised of family members and estate administrators sued firearm
manufacturers and retailers for the death of individuals who died at the hand
of illegal firearms.134 The plaintiffs premised their claim on manufacturers
intentionally selling firearms to juvenile gang members.135 The court held
that defendants manufacturing and selling of firearms constituted a public
right because individuals have a public right to be safe in public.136
Notably, the plaintiffs failed to raise any violations of federal or state laws
125. Id. at 1214 (quoting Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, 768 N.E.2d 1136,
1142 (Ohio 2002)).
126. Ileto, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
127. City of Philadelphia v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3rd Cir.
2002).
128. Id. at 421.
129. Id. at 420 (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 86 at
616-18 (5th ed. 1984)).
130. Id. at 422.
131. Id.
132. Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1091 (Ill. 2004).
133. Id. at 1082.
134. Id. at 1080.
135. Id. at 1082.
136. Id. at 1084.
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concerning the manufacturing, marketing, or selling of firearms.137 The
court stated that when an injury occurs in a highly regulated industry, so
long as the defendant is not intentionally negligent, then the defendant will
not be liable under the doctrine of public nuisance.138 Ultimately, the court
reasoned that reliance should be placed on the legislature in public nuisance
cases for manufactured products in heavily regulated industries.139 Lastly,
the court concluded that even if there was a public right, the defendants
were not the direct and proximate cause of the injury.140
In contrast, in the City of Gary Ex Rel. King v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., plaintiffs complaint survived defendants motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.141 The plaintiffs brought a claim for public
nuisance, alleging the defendants negligently marketed and sold firearms
that ended up in the hands up criminals, which, as a result, lead to an
increased cost in protecting the public.142 The court reasoned that
defendants’ negligent conduct, when applied to the doctrine of public
nuisance, might lead a jury to conclude that there was unreasonable
interference with the public right to health and safety.143 The court denied
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because, on the face of the
complaint, plaintiffs had pleaded enough to prove that a duty existed and
that said duty had been breached.144 In determining whether a duty existed,
the court “balance[ed] … foreseeability, public policy, and the relationship
between the parties.145 Therefore, a jury might conclude that a public right
was violated when the defendant breached their duty.146
In N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., the plaintiffs brought suit against
gun manufacturers, alleging that a public nuisance arose from gun
manufacturers’ failure to limit the sale of guns and deter firearm
violence.147 The plaintiffs claim that their public right to health and safety
were injured due to the misuse of firearms.148 The court was unpersuaded
by this argument and held that the harm suffered by plaintiffs was no

137. Id. at 1085.
138. Id. at 1084.
139. Id. at 1091.
140. Id.
141. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222,
1249 (Ind. 2003).
142. Id. at 1228.
143. Id. at 1248.
144. Id. at 1242.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1248.
147. N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 2d 435, 446-47 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
148. Id. at 508.
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different from that of the general public.149 In order to show harm under
the doctrine of public nuisance, a plaintiff must show that they have
suffered a “particular harm not shared in common with the rest of the
public.”150 Harm different in kind does not mean severity or degree of
harm.151 Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to allege a harm different in kind
because the police and New York government owe all residents the same
duty of protection and safety.152
In the City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, Chicago sued firearm
manufacturers for costs associated with gun violence.153 According to the
court, Chicago failed to recognize a public right to general safety because
“any dangerous instrumentality in the community could … threaten” a
public right.154 The court further stated that “a public right is ‘not like the
individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted.’”155 Therefore,
Chicago’s action for public nuisance cannot be maintained.156
4. Public Nuisance: Pharmaceutical Industry
In 2017, the pharmaceutical industry was worth over $900
157
billion.
The pharmaceutical industry is also heavily regulated at the
federal and state level.158 Even with such regulation, opioid deaths have
been on an accelerating rise since the 1990s.159
In Labzda v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiffs brought an
action against Purdue Pharmaceuticals, alleging that the wrongful death of
their son was due to a public nuisance created by Purdue
Pharmaceuticals.160 Before the death of the plaintiffs’ son, he was
prescribed opioids for chronic pain management.161 A few years later, their
149. Id. at 499.
150. Id. at 497 (citing Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N.Y. 360, 370 (N.Y. 1887)).
151. Id. at 489 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN
RECOVER FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(C) cmt. h. (Am. Law Inst. 1979)).
152. Id. at 499.
153. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1105 (Ill.
2004).
154. Id. at 1116.
155. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821 (B)
cmt., g).
156. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1148.
157. The Growing Pharmaceuticals Market: Expert Forecasts and Analysis,
THE BUSINESS RESEARCH COMPANY, (May 2018), https://blog.marketresearch.com/thegrowing-pharmaceuticals-market-expert-forecasts-and-analysis.
158. Charles L. Hooper, Pharmaceuticals: Economics and Regulation,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PharmaceuticalsEconomicsandRegulation.html.
159. Opioid Data Analysis and Resources, CDC (2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html.
160. Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1348 (S.D. Fla.
2003).
161. Id.

2021]

THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

49

son overdosed.162 First, the court held that pharmaceutical manufacturers
are not liable for the actions of prescribing physicians.163 In addition, the
plaintiffs’ son willfully took drugs after being repeatedly warned of the
dangers.164 As a result, Purdue Pharmaceutical was not the proximate cause
of the plaintiffs’ son’s death.165 Thus, the court dismissed the lawsuit.166
In Ashley County, Ark. v. Pfizer, twenty Arkansas counties brought
public nuisance claims against methamphetamine manufacturers.167 The
plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ created a public nuisance by
manufacturing cold and allergy medication that they knew was being
illegally synthesized into methamphetamine, and therefore increasing the
societal cost of addiction treatment.168 The court held that there were no
intervening causes leading to the increased societal cost of addiction
treatment and were not the direct result of the defendants actions.169
Therefore, there can be no claim for nuisance.170
Since 2018, more than half of the United States have filed lawsuits
against drug manufacturers for deceptive marketing strategies or on public
nuisance grounds.171 The instant case, the State of Oklahoma v. Purdue
Pharmaceuticals, is important because the plaintiff argued that defendants’
false and misleading marketing tactics lead to the opioid epidemic.172
Unlike typical product liability theories, the plaintiffs do not argue that the
products were defective. Instead, they argued that defendants conduct
increased rates of addiction and increased costs associated with treating
addiction.173
The following section will discuss the procedural history, facts, and
holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceutical. Subsequently, this Comment
will analyze the facts in State v. Purdue Pharmaceutical under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. This Comment will then compare the facts
and holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals with similar cases
regarding product liability. Thereafter, this Comment will discuss the
possible reasonings that might have been behind the judgment. Lastly, this
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1356.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 662-63 (8th Cir. 2009).
168. Id. at 662-63.
169. Id. at 669.
170. Id. at 673.
171. 17-2804 – In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation,
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-ohnd-1_17-md-02804/USCOURTSohnd-1_17-md-02804-0/summary.
172. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12.
173. Id. at 15-21.
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Comment will provide a summary of possible consequences that may occur
as a result of the extension.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS OF STATE V. PURDUE
PHARMACEUTICALS
A. Procedural History
This suit was brought in the District Court of Cleveland County in
Oklahoma by the Attorney General of Oklahoma on behalf of the State of
Oklahoma on June 30th, 2017, against drug manufacturers, their
subsidiaries, sister corporations, agents, and principals. 174 The defendants
included Purdue Pharmaceutical L.P., Purdue Pharmaceutical, Inc., Purdue
Frederick Company, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Cephalon, Inc.,
Johnson & Johnson, Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.,
Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC, Actavis LLC, and Watson
Laboratories, Inc.175
Oklahoma reached a settlement agreement with Purdue
Pharmaceuticals, L.P., Purdue Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Purdue Frederick
Company Inc. on March 26th, 2019.176 Furthermore, on June 7th, 2019, a
second settlement was entered between Oklahoma and Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.177
On August 26th, 2019, the District Court of Cleveland County
rendered a judgment in favor of Oklahoma, against the remaining
defendants Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Jannsen Pharmaceuticals,
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC,
Actavis LLC, and Watson Laboratories, Inc. for $572,102,028.178
B. Factual Summary
The State of Oklahoma is currently experiencing an opioid
epidemic.179 Oklahoma began experiencing issues from a rising opioid
epidemic during the mid-1990s.180 Throughout the 1990s, defendants
promoted, manufactured, and sold opioid-based drugs such as Duragesic,
Ultram, Ultram Extended Release, Ultracet, Nucynta, Nucynta Extended
174. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1.
175. Id.
176. Settlement Agreement, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816,
2019 WL 4059721 (Dist. Ct. Okla. 2019).
177. Id.
178. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *20.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
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Release, Tylenol with Codeine, and Tylox.181 As part of a pain
management scheme, defendants’ opioid-based drugs were said to treat
chronic and non-chronic pain without discussing the risk of addiction.182
The overall purpose of the defendants’ pain management scheme was to
increase revenue.183
For example, in support of the defendants’ pain management
scheme, in 1980, Johnson & Johnson obtained and formed two subsidiaries
to secure the supply of the necessary ingredients to produce opioid-based
drugs.184 Those subsidiaries, Noramco and Tasmanian Alkaloids, became
the “number #1 supplier of Narcotic APIs in the United States, the world’s
largest market.”185 However, in 2016, Johnson & Johnson sold those two
subsidiaries used in manufacturing materials for opioids.186
Defendants targeted individuals with chronic cancer pain and
chronic non-cancer pain.187 In promoting their pain management schemes,
defendants publicized the low risk of opioid addiction and, simultaneously,
claimed that pain was undertreated and harmful.188 Defendants partook in
branded and unbranded marketing techniques.189 The defendants focused
their efforts on government agencies, doctors, and the general public.190
The ultimate goal was to increase the sale of opioid-based drugs.191
Defendants’ advertised their opioid-based drugs to Oklahoma
residents through websites and brochures.192 Defendants’ strategies also
included marketing tactics that discussed the harm of chronic pain on
patients, the prevalence of chronic pain, and the likelihood that acute pain
would turn into chronic pain if untreated.193 For example, “Prescribe
Responsibly” was a website designed to increase the number of opioid
prescriptions alleging, that additional prescriptions were the solution to
pseudo-addiction.194 Brochures further promoted opioid prescriptions as a
solution to avoid possible negative consequences of undertreated chronic
pain.195 Furthermore, defendants gave coupons and sample vouchers to
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2-5.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 2-3.
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id. at 4-5.
187. Id. at 4-6.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id. at 5.
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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patients that were prescribed opioid-based drugs in an attempt to increase
sales.196
To incentivize doctors to prescribe more opioid-based drugs,
defendants funded research articles, funded medical programs to continue
education, funded speaking engagements, and had their pharmaceutical
sales representative educate medical professionals.197 Moreover, they held
seminars, dinners, symposiums, and conferences.198 Defendants intended
for doctors to widely prescribe opioids for any area of “chronic pain [that]
was undertreated.”199 For example, in 1996, a “Consensus Statement” was
issued by two pain advocacy groups funded by the defendants.200 The
majority of the committee involved in drafting the consensus on opioids
had personal ties with the defendants.201 The report described government
regulation and addiction as barriers to the use of opioids.202 The report
furthered the idea that pain was undertreated and must be resolved.203 The
“Consensus Statement” was repeatedly used in marketing and sales by
defendants.204
Pharmaceutical representatives were told by defendants to avoid
any negative phrasing when it came to promoting opioids.205 These
representatives also promoted a “study from Dr. Portenoy” that encouraged
doctors to prescribe more opioids.206 Moreover, sales representatives
alleged that opioids prescribed by physicians were less addictive than
opioids by other means.207 Pharmaceutical representatives emphasized the
undertreatment of acute pain as an additional means to increase
prescriptions.208 The defendants, in no way, attempted to educate their
pharmaceutical representatives as to addiction, addiction to opioids, or the
opioid epidemic.209 The report included research funded by defendants.210
Even if patients experienced signs of addiction, defendants
convinced doctors that patients were experiencing “pseudo-addiction” and

196. Id. at 7.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id. at 5,
200. Id. at 7.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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should prescribe more.211 Patients labeled with pseudo-addiction typically
requested a dosage increase or refills before their script “should have run
out.”212 In support, defendants’ sales representatives cited a study by Allan,
Simpson, and Milligan, which was later found to be “false and
misleading.”213
In 2001, defendants deliberately ignored a recommendation by one
of their scientists to halt misleading marketing strategies when it came to
promoting opioids and their likelihood of addiction.214 In addition, their
scientist informed them that no data supported their claims as to the low
risk of addiction and abuse.215
In 2004, the FDA informed defendants that the information
conveyed concerning Duragesic was false and misleading when it came to
the probability of addiction and abuse.216 The FDA was unable to find any
evidence or data in support of the defendants’ claim that Duragesic was not
addictive nor likely to be abused.217 The FDA ordered defendants to stop
all false or misleading marketing techniques as to Duragesic due to a
violation of 21 U.S.C. §352(a).218 The FDA further ordered that all
marketing techniques used for Duragesic must comply with federal
regulations.219
Doctors alleged that defendants marketing strategies led them to
prescribe excessive amounts of opioids.220 Moreover, some doctors even
faced criminal prosecution due to the volume of opioids prescribed to
patients.221
The increase in opioid prescriptions increased opioid-related deaths
in Oklahoma.222 In addition to opioid overdoses, the state of Oklahoma
experienced an increase in “opioid use disorder, the rise in NAS, and
children entering the child welfare system.”223

211. Id. at 5.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Id. at 8.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 9.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 9-11.
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id. at 9-11
223. Id. at 10.
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C. Court’s Analysis
Oklahoma argued that the defendants’ intentional false and
misleading dissemination of opioid prescriptions constituted a public
nuisance under Okla. Stat. Tit. 50 §1.224 Oklahoma alleged that the number
of opioid prescriptions increased based on defendants’ manufacturing,
promoting, and selling of opioid-based drugs.225 The alleged injury was the
increased societal costs in providing healthcare and other government
associated services that pertain to enforcement and treatment of opioid
addiction.226 Defendants, on the other hand, claimed that the plaintiff did
not meet their burden of proof required by public nuisance.227 However,
defendants conceded that their advertising campaign was false and
misleading.228
The Court opined that because “the defendants’ false, misleading,
and dangerous marketing campaign caused exponentially increasing rates
of addiction, overdose deaths, and Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, I [the
Court] conclude these are unlawful acts which ‘annoys, injures, or
endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others.’”229 The court
ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
defendants did, in fact, cause a public nuisance.230
In Oklahoma, under 50 O.S. 1981 § 1, a nuisance consists in
unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which act or
omission either:
First. Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose,
health or safety of others; or
Second. Offends decency; or
Third. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to
obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any lake or
navigable river, stream, canal or basin, or any public park,
square, street or highway; or
Fourth. In any way renders other persons insecure in life, or
in the use of property, provided, this section shall not apply
to preexisting agricultural activities.231

224. Id. at 1.
225. Id. at 9-11.
226. Id. at 15-21.
227. Id. at 1.
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 11-12.
231. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 8 (West 2020).
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According to 50 O.S. § 2, a public nuisance “is one which affects at the
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage
inflicted upon the individuals may be unequal.”232
The actions committed by the defendants included their “false,
misleading, and dangerous marketing campaigns.” 233 In addition, these
actions “… annoy[ed], injure[d], or endanger[ed] the comfort, repose,
health, or safety of others.”234 Defendants’ marketing techniques
specifically increased “rates of addiction, overdose deaths, and Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome.”235
The Court further found that defendants’ conduct was the cause in
fact of the injuries suffered by Oklahoma and its residents.236 Furthermore,
the defendants willfully understated the consequences of opioid-based
drugs, broadened product distribution, took data out of context, and actively
promoted opioid-based medication in contrast to company policy. 237
In addition, the District Court concluded that the doctrine of public
nuisance extends to claims outside of those that include real property and
now to those of corporate activity.238 In the instant case, corporate activity
by the defendants includes the use of “real and personal property, private
and public, as well as the public roads, buildings and land of the State of
Oklahoma, to create this nuisance.”239 In support of this conclusion, the
District Court cited an Oklahoma Supreme Court case that further extended
nuisance to conduct which infringes upon the just rights of an individual.240
In Oklahoma, a supervening cause may mitigate the liability of a
defendant in an action for public nuisance.241 If there were any acts or
omissions by the plaintiff that directly or even proximately contributed to
the public nuisance by the defendant, then the defendants actions would not
be the proximate cause of the nuisance.242 A supervening cause requires
that the new cause be “(1) independent of the original act, (2) adequate of
232. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 2 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2020). But
see OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 50, § 4 (West, Westlaw through Sept 1, 2020) (providing that
any activity expressly permitted by a statute does not constitute a public nuisance, and
potentially rendering the entire holding invalid because defendants met all statutory
requirements regarding the sale and distribution of their opioid-based drugs).
233. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 11.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 11 (citing Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33, 36 (Okla. 1985)).
241. Id. at 14.
242. Id.
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itself to bring about the result and (3) one whose occurrence was not
reasonably foreseeable to the original actor.”243 The Court further found
that there were no supervening causes to mitigate the defendants’
liability.244
D. Damages
In Oklahoma, a plaintiff may seek an indictment, information, a
civil action, or abatement as remedies for a nuisance.245
However,
indictment or information may only be sought where criminal charges or
punishment are brought against a defendant for public nuisance.246 If the
plaintiff is a public body or authorized by law, then they may bring suit to
abate a nuisance.247 In addition, cities, towns, and counties may similarly
abate a nuisance under Oklahoma law.248
The relief sought by the state was for an abatement of the
nuisance.249 The court held that abatement of the nuisance was reasonable
and necessary as a proper remedy for the injury suffered by the plaintiffs.250
The breakdown of costs is as follows:
Program
Yearly Cost
Opioid Disorder Prevention and Treatment
$232,947,710251
Programs
Supplementary Addiction Programs
$31,796,011252
Public Medication and Disposal Programs
$139,883253
Universal Screening Programs
$56,857,054254
Pain Prevention and Non-Opioid Pain
$103,277,835255
Management Programs
Naloxone Distribution and Overdose
$1,585,797256
Prevention Education
Patient Management and Consultations
$3,953,832257
243. Id. at 14 (quoting Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 348 (Okla. 1993)).
244. Id. at 14.
245. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 8 (West 2020).
246. Id. § 9 (West 2020).
247. Id. § 11 (West 2020),
248. Id. § 16 (West 2020); Id. 2020 § 20 (West 2020).
249. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1.
250. Id. at 15.
251. Id. at 15-16.
252. Id. at 16.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 17.
257. Id.
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Continuing Education for Doctors to Deal
with Neonatal AS
Hospital Funding for NAS Programs,
Treatment, and Equipment
Prenatal Opioid Screening Program
Infant Withdrawal Program
Law Enforcement Regulation, Enforcement
and Investigation
Total Amount That Defendants are Liable
For:
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$107,683,000258
$181,983259
$1,969,000260
$20,608,847261
$11,101,076262
$572,102,028263

IV. ANALYSIS
The analysis section, in this Comment, will apply the facts in State
v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals to the doctrine of public nuisance under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Although not binding, restatements are
helpful compilations of common law rules and trends from courts across
the country.264 Furthermore, this section will demonstrate, in detail, how
the Judge reached his conclusion, but how his conclusion was incorrect.
First, the Judge incorrectly identified a public right. Second, even if a public
right did exist, the Judge disregarded the proximate cause requirement,
which would have mitigated liability. Therefore, the judgment should be
reversed. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following
criteria for public nuisance:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an
interference with a right is unreasonable include the
following:
(a) whether the conduct involves a
significant interference with the public
health, safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience, or

258. Id.
259. Id. at 17-18.
260. Id. at 18.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 18-20.
263. Id. at 20.
264. About the ALI, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (date accessed Nov. 1, 2020),
https://www.ali.org/about-ali/.
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(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a
statute,
ordinance
or
administrative
regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing
nature or has produced a permanent or longlasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon
the public right.265
To have standing for public nuisance, the individual must have “suffered
harm different in kind” than that by other members of the public.266
First, this section will determine whether the plaintiffs have
standing to sue. Second, this section will determine whether a public right
exists to be free from opioid addiction. Third, this section will determine
whether the defendants’ conduct of manufacturing, marketing, and selling
opioid-based drugs substantially and unreasonably interfered with a public
right. Fifth, this section will discuss whether defendants were the
proximate cause of the alleged injury. Lastly, this section will discuss any
defenses that might mitigate or negate liability.
A. Oklahoma had standing to bring this action against defendants.
According to the Second Restatement of Torts, an individual must
have standing to recover for injuries sustained by a public nuisance.267
Standing requires that the injury suffered must be “of a kind different from
that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common
to the general public that was the subject of interference.” 268 In determining
if injury is different in kind, the court may consider the degree of
interference experienced by the plaintiff(s).269 The harm suffered as a result
of the nuisance may be physical, monetary, an inconvenience, or difficulty
in exercising a right to that specific individual.270 Furthermore, private

265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law
Inst. 1979).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC
NUISANCE § 821(C).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC
NUISANCE § 821(C) cmt. c.
268. Id.; see also Anon., Y.B. Mich., 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1536) (Eng.); see
Diamond, 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 377; see also Ileto, 349 F.3d 1191, 1212.
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC
NUISANCE § 821(C).
270. Id.
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individuals or statutorily approved government entities or officials may
bring suits for public nuisance.271
In Oklahoma, due to the opioid epidemic, the general public
experienced increased deaths, addiction, crime, and costs.272 However, the
injury suffered by the state of Oklahoma included the increased costs of
providing healthcare, law enforcement, and other government services
associated with the implementation, enforcement, and treatment.273
Therefore, the harm suffered by the government was different in kind than
that suffered by the general public. Both the general public and the
government experienced harm due to the opioid epidemic. However, the
bulk of the harm from the costs associated with managing the epidemic fell
on the government.274 Thus, the government, under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, had standing to bring this public nuisance action.
A public nuisance merely requires the opportunity to harm or impact
an individual in society.275 The injury suffered must occur during the
exercise of a public right.276 Thus, although the public nuisance has a
possibility to impact everyone in the general public, it may only injure those
that exercise their public right.277
In the instant case, the injury suffered by the State of Oklahoma was
pecuniary.278 Funds expended for health care, enforcement, and treatment
are associated with the opioid epidemic in Oklahoma.279 Therefore, the
government suffered harm in exercising their public right. Thus, the
government, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, had standing to bring
this public nuisance action.
B. Oklahoma does not have a public right of health and safety to be
addiction free.
Under the doctrine of public nuisance, the injury must occur while
exercising a public right.280 “A public right is one common to all members
of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual
271. Id.
272. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12.
273. Id. at 15-21.
274. Id.
275. State v. Lead Indus., Ass’n, Inc., 951 A. 2d 428, 447-48 (R.I. 2008).
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. g
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
277. Id. at cmt. g.
278. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21.
279. Id.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law
Inst. 1979).
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right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or
negligently injured.”281 However, statutory construction may waive the
strict public right requirement if the statute specifies that interference only
needs to be with “any considerable number of persons.”282 Although not
exhaustive, the Second Restatement of Torts identifies the public rights to
health, safety, morals, peace, and convenience are all public rights.283
Furthermore, a statutes may also dictate public rights.284
Many judges, scholars, and legal experts struggle in determining
public rights. There are two approaches, one narrow and one broad. In
general, a public right is ‘not like the individual right that everyone has not
to be assaulted.’”285 In 2008, the supreme court of Rhode Island suggested
that to satisfy the requirement of a public right, the plaintiff must provide
more than a general interference with “health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience.”286 It has been further suggested by law review articles that
there are no public rights to “standards of living … holding a job … and
there is no common law public right to a certain standard of medical care
or housing.”287 In contrast, the broad interpretation of a public right like in
ConAgra, the California appeals court held that a public right only requires
a societal interest.288 In Young, the court furthered the broad interpretation
of public right to imply that individuals on public property have an in
general right to public safety.289
According to the Court, defendants participated in unlawful acts that
lead to increased addiction and death within Oklahoma communities.290
However, in making this statement, the judge failed to identify the issue at
hand. The judge failed to accurately determine the public right. The opinion
identified the defendants’ conduct and then concluded that there was harm
to public health. The true issue at hand is whether Oklahoma has a public
right to be free from addiction, not whether there was harm.

281. Id. at cmt. g.
282. Id.
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. b
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
284. Id. at cmt. c.
285. Lead Industries, 951 A.2d 428, 543-4 (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts: Public Nuisance § 821 (B) cmt. e). State v. Lead Indus., Ass’n, Inc., 951 A. 2d
428, 436-37 (R.I. 2008).
286. Id. at 543-44.
287. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003).
288. People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 112 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2017)
289. Young, 812 N.E. 2d 1078, 1084.
290. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12.
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Under a narrow interpretation, a court would likely conclude that
there is no public right to be free from addiction. The right to be free from
addiction seems analogous to the private right to not be assaulted.
Moreover, the right to be free from addiction is comparable to the absence
of a public right to specific standards of living. In contrast, under a broad
interpretation of a public right, a court would likely conclude that the
general public has a societal interest in being free from addiction.
Furthermore, under a broad interpretation, a court might elaborate on the
impact of addiction to a community and the harm to public property because
most addicts will increase the number of those homeless and, thereafter,
live on public property.
The dilemma faced by each court is whether to take the narrow or
broad definition of a public right. A court, in making this determination,
should consider precedence, public policy, legislative enactments, and
legislative intent. If courts were to expand the definition of public right,
this could lead to a public right organic food. Where all farmers or food
manufacturers are liable for using any chemicals on their food that have the
potential to harm individuals. The idea of a public right could be further
extended to blame food manufacturers or even private individuals for
increased healthcare costs that society incurs as a result. Without
limitations, this extension could allow a public right to be anything that
harms society. Alternatively, the expansion of a public right might lead to
more vigilant product safety measures and more consumer-minded
businesses. If a statute expressly identifies a public right to be addictionfree, then the court should defer to the legislature. In addition, if legislature
enacted substance abuse preventative measures, legislative intent may also
include comments on a public right to being addiction free. In the instant
case, Oklahoma prohibits all legal activities from being held a public
nuisance, suggesting a hesitancy to hold companies liable for activities
conducted legally.291 Further, there are federal and state statutes regulating
the sale, production, marketing, and use of pharmaceuticals. Indicating
strong legislative policy interests. In addition, there are consumer
protection laws established by the legislature to protect individuals from
injuries that arise. Therefore, a narrow interpretation would more closely
align with statutory intent, public policy, and current statutes.
The definition of public rights should not be expanded to include a
right to be free from addiction. Although addiction impacts an entire
community, the right to be addiction-free is private. In addition, if the
291. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2020)
(providing that any activity expressly permitted by a statute does not constitute a public
nuisance and potentially rendering the entire holding invalid because defendants met all
statutory requirements regarding the sale and distribution of their opioid-based drugs).
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definition of public rights were to expand, courts will see a flood of
litigation concerning new potential public rights. An individual might
assert a claim for public nuisance alleging harm to a public right solely
because a third party used an item, outside of its intended use, and harmed
them.
Lastly, the pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated.
Pharmaceutical companies must meet and maintain state and federal
requirements for all marketing, manufacturing, and selling.292 If the
legislature had intended to identify a public right in such statutes, they
would have done so.
In conclusion, there is no public right to be addiction free. However,
the restatement suggests that even in the absence of a public right, statutory
construction may still permit an action under the doctrine of public
nuisance.293 In the instant case, under 50 O.S. 1981 § 2, there need not be
a public right due to the broad language in the statute.294 Therefore, if a
court were to choose the broad definition of public right or if the state has
broad statutory language that forgives the public right requirement, then we
must determine if there was unreasonable and significant interference with
the public right to health and safety.
C. Defendants unintentionally and unreasonably interfered with
Oklahoma and its citizen’s public right.
Once a public right or an exception has been established, the
doctrine of public nuisance requires that interference with the public right
to be unreasonable and significant.295 Under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, although not conclusive, the court may consider these instances as
unreasonable:
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference
with the public health, safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance
or administrative regulation, or

292. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822 (West 2018); 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West, 2018); 21
U.S.C.A. § 825 (West, 2018).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e
(Am Law. Inst. 1979).
294. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 2 (West). The broad language of this statute
implies that the judge was correct in concluding that a public right exists. However,
under my analysis from existing case law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a
different conclusion is reached. However, his extension of public right was plausible.
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (AM. LAW
INST. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SIGNIFICANT HARM § 821(F).
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(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the
actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect
upon the public right.296
Unreasonable interference may either be intentional or unintentional
actions by the defendant.297 Both intentional and unintentional interference
requires either action or inaction by the defendants.298 Therefore, to
determine if interference was unreasonable, we must determine if the
defendants conduct interfered with a public right and then whether such
interference was significant.
1. Defendants unintentionally interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to
health and safety.
The issue at hand is whether the defendants’ actions of
manufacturing, selling, and promoting opioid-based drugs unreasonably
and significantly interfered with the public right to health and safety of
being addiction-free.299 First, we must consider whether the defendants
intentionally interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to health and safety
to be addiction free. If we find that defendants’ interference was not
intentional, then we must determine if their conduct unintentionally
interfered with the public right.300 Lastly, if we find that defendants
interfered unintentionally or intentionally with a public right to be
addiction-free, then we must consider if the interference was reasonable.
A. Defendants did not intentionally interfere with Oklahoma public
right to be addiction-free.
Any intentional interference with a public right is unreasonable.301
When a tortfeasor acts intentionally to interfere with an individual’s public
right or if there is a high probability of interference, then the tortfeasor’s
actions are unreasonable.302 However, even if a tortfeasor’s actions are
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law
Inst. 1979).
297. Id. at cmt. e.
298. Id.
299. Recall that this article ultimately concludes that there is no public right to
be addiction-free. This section merely discusses the exception or a broad interpretation.
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
301. Id. at cmt. e.
302. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL INVASION – WHAT
CONSTITUTES § 825.
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intentional, then the court must consider the potential benefits, costs, and
harms associated with those actions.303
In AcuSport, the court stated that intentional conduct that interferes
with a public right requires more than a “general awareness” or knowledge
that harm may occur or that there are potential risks involved with their
conduct.304 Intent requires that the manufacturer “knows or is substantially
certain that its marketing practices have a significant impact on the
likelihood that” opioid-based drugs will result in “substantial harm to the
public” through addiction and costs therein associated.305 However, once
an individual becomes aware that they are affecting a public right and
makes no effort to change their conduct, then they will have intentionally
interfered with the public right.306
The facts of the case make no indication that the defendants
intended for the sale, promotion, or manufacturing of opioid-based drugs to
increase costs and death associated with addiction to their products.
According to the facts, the purpose was to generate revenue.307
However, two instances might indicate that defendants’ actions
intentionally interfered with the public right to be addiction-free because
there might have been a high probability of interference. First, in 2001,
defendants ignored a recommendation to halt misleading marketing
strategies regarding opioid-based drugs.308 Second, in 2004, the FDA
informed the defendants that they were spreading false and misleading
information concerning the likelihood of addiction and abuse of
Duragesic.309 These two instances are examples of conduct that could have
lead defendants to believe their marketing strategy was false and
misleading, resulting in an increase in addiction and costs associated with
addiction. Conversely, defendants may have known that their marketing
strategies were false and misleading but not have foreseen the consequence
of harm to the health and safety of society. Under the facts of the instant
case, the main focus of defendants was profit-oriented and not focused on
externalities. Therefore, although a court might find that defendants
intentionally interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to health and safety,
it is unlikely that they would.
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law
Inst. 1979); See Also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: UNREASONABLENESS OF INTENTIONAL
INVASION § 826.
304. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 488.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *4.
308. Id. at 8.
309. Id. at 9.
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In conclusion, the defendants did not intentionally interfere with a
public right to be addiction free. Consequently, we must consider if
defendants’ actions unintentionally interfered with a public right to be
addiction free.
B. Defendants’ unintentionally and negligently interfered with
Oklahoma’s public right to be addiction-free health.
In contrast to intentional interference, if the action that harms a
public right was unintentional, then the court will consider if the
interference was due to other actionable torts, such as negligence or
recklessness.310 Therefore, we must determine if the defendants’ actions of
promoting, selling, and manufacturing opioid-based drugs unintentionally
interfered with a public right.
A court may find that a tortfeasor interfered with a public right if
the harm resulted from unintentionally negligent conduct.311 Negligence is
“the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation.”312 According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual is negligent if they act or fail
to act regarding a duty and said action or inaction falls below a reasonable
standard of care designed to protect others from an unreasonable risk of
harm.313 Furthermore, a defendant may be negligent for failing to warn an
individual of the potential harm.314
(a) a defendant whose conduct creates a risk of physical or
emotional harm can fail to exercise reasonable care by
failing to warn of the danger if:
(1) the defendant knows or has reason to
know: (a) of that risk; and (b) that those
encountering the risk will be unaware of it;
and
(2) a warning might be effective in reducing
the risk of harm.
(b) Even if the defendant adequately warns of the risk that
the defendant’s conduct creates, the defendant can fail to
exercise reasonable care by failing to adopt further
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
311. Id.
312. Negligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
313. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE DEFINED § 282 cmt. a-e.
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).
314. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN § 18.
(Am. Law Inst. 2020).
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precautions to protect against the risk if it is foreseeable that
despite the warning some risk of harm remains.315
Furthermore, an actor may still be negligent for failing to take additional
precautions, even though they were following those required by statute.316
A finding of negligence requires that the defendant owe a duty of
care to the public and that the defendant breach said public duty by failing
to maintain a reasonable standard of care.317 Typically, in determining
whether a duty exists, courts “balance … foreseeability, public policy, and
the relationship between the parties.318 However, the balancing test is only
required if the law has not yet established such a duty by law.319 For
example, in Oklahoma, drug manufacturers only owe a duty to the
prescriber, which requires disclosure as to the potential side effects or risks
associated with its use, not to the patient.320 In general, pharmaceutical
manufacturers owe a duty to warn consumers of potential risks when
required by the FDA and when other exceptions are carved out by law.321
However, compliance with the FDA is not a shield from liability and a mere
minimum duty.322 Therefore, states may impose heightened duties on
pharmaceutical manufacturers.323
First, it is important to note that the court does conclude that doctors
were misled regarding the prescribing practices of opioid-based
medications.324 Therefore, that alone would be sufficient to find that
pharmaceutical manufacturers breached their duty of care. However, it
does seem that the judge offered little evidence on the information provided
to doctors other than pseudo-addiction and false reports.325
In the instant case, however, it is likely that a duty exists to
adequately inform all potential purchasers of opioid-based drugs of the risks
315. Id.
316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: STATUTORY COMPLIANCE § 16. (Am.
Law Inst. 2010).
317. AcuSport, 271 F.Supp. 2d at 435, 488.
318. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp. 801 N.E. 2d 1222,
1242 (Ind. 2003).
319. Id.
320. Edwards, 933 P. 2d 298, 301.
321. Id. at 301-02.
322. Id. at 303.
323. Id.
324. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *9-11.
325. In determining if there was a breach of duty, we must first determine
whether there was a duty. Therefore, two questions must be considered in determining if
there was a breach of duty: (1) was there a duty to notify users of the potential risks
associated with opioid-based drugs and (2) if defendants do owe a duty, was said duty
breached by failing to exercise reasonable care. In the instant case, the court held that
defendants breached their duty to consumers by failing to warn of the risks associated
with taking opioid-based drugs.
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associated with their use. Therefore, any failure to adequately or
sufficiently warn, especially after being warned by the FDA, would most
likely be a violation of their duty. Defendants have a duty, under FDA
regulations, to properly label information regarding the side effects and
risks associated with any drug.326 As noted earlier, defendants, in 2001,
were warned and failed to take adequate precautions associated with the
risk of opioid-based drugs.327 Therefore, defendants likely had a duty to
inform both doctors and patients properly of the risks associated with their
drugs and the act of misleading them was negligent.
In summary, it is likely that defendants’ actions of manufacturing,
marketing, and selling opioid-based drugs played a major role and are
related to the opioid epidemic that resulted. Their conduct of misleading
marketing tactics was negligent. Therefore, defendants unintentionally
interfered with the public right to health and safety. Once a court has
established a public right or an exception and that there was interference,
then the court must consider the significance of the harm.
2. Plaintiffs’ experienced significant harm due to defendants false and
misleading marketing tactics.
In addition to there being an unreasonable interference with a public
right, such an interference must be significant.328 Almost all activities can
interfere, harm, or annoy those in society.329 The significance of the harm
must be objectively determined considering all relevant factors.330
The harm associated with opioid-based addiction is not only severe
in Oklahoma, but around the United States.331 In Oklahoma due to the
opioid epidemic, the general public experienced increased deaths,
addiction, crime, and costs.332 The purpose of opioid-based drugs is to help
individuals manage chronic pain. In the absence of opioids, individuals may
be stuck with chronic, untreatable pain. However, opioids are highly
addictive. Costs associated with addiction impact the individual taking the
drugs and the community at large. Due to the high number of alternatives,

326. 21 U.S.C.A. § 825 (West 2018).
327. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *8.
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SIGNIFICANT HARM § 821(F). (Am.
Law Inst. 1979.
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g. (Am.
Law Inst. 1979).
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GRAVITY OF HARM – FACTORS § 827
cmt. b. (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
331. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *2.
332. Id. at *18.

68

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39:1

less addictive, pain management techniques, I believe that the costs
associated with opioid use do not outweigh its benefits.
Therefore, if an exception to the public right requirement exists,
then the defendants unreasonably interfered with Oklahoma’s public right
to be addiction free. First, defendants unreasonably and unintentionally
partook in false and misleading marketing which led to the negligent
prescribing and taking of their products. Second, the harm experienced by
the entire state was significant. Nonetheless, even with interference and
harm, a court, in determining whether defendants can be held liable, must
determine if they were the proximate cause of the unreasonable interference
and injuries that resulted.333
D. Defendants were not the proximate cause of Oklahoma’s injury.
A tortfeasor will only be held liable for injuries to another if their
conduct was the proximate cause of the injuries.334 The purpose of
proximate cause is to limit liability to injuries that are foreseeable as a result
of tortfeasor’s actions.335 The United States Supreme Court suggests that
“proximate cause reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is
administratively possible and convenient.’”336 A defendant is the
proximate cause of an injury when their actions, “in a natural and
continuous sequence [resulting from their actions], unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produced the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.”337 “A plaintiff who cannot establish “
‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
alleged’ ” fails to plead “a key element for establishing proximate
causation, independent of and in addition to other traditional elements
of proximate cause.”338

333. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (citing Taylor Bay Protective Ass’n v. Adm’r,
U.S. Ep. P.A., 844 F.2d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989)).
334. Id.
335. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mendoza
v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
336. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (2002)
(citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of
Torts § 41 p. 264 (5th ed. 1984)).
337. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 666 (citing City of Caddo Valley v. George, 9
S.W.3d 481, 487 (2000)).
338. Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F. 3d
229, 235 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. 248, 268-9); see also Philadelphia,
277 F.3d 415, 423.
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Proximate cause has been interpreted to include cause in fact and
legal cause.339 However, an intervening act may shield an individual from
liability if such an act is “sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury’ and
the intervening act is ‘totally independent’ of the original act.”340
1. Defendants’ conduct was not the cause in fact of Oklahoma injury.
Cause in fact requires that there be “a reasonable certainty that a
defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.”341 As put by the Missouri
supreme court, legal cause turns on whether the “harm is the reasonable and
probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”342 Therefore, the
“alleged harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.”343
The Ohio supreme court, in Cincinnati, provided factors to consider when
determining the remoteness of harm from the alleged conduct.344
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it
becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages
attributable to the violation, as distinct from other,
independent, factors. * * * Second, quite apart from
problems of proving factual causation, recognizing claims
of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs
removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts,
to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. * * * And, finally,
the need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified
by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since
directly injured victims can generally be counted on to
vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any
of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured
more remotely.345
In the instant case, Oklahoma alleged that their direct harm included
increased costs of providing healthcare, law enforcement, and other
government associated services that pertain to implementation,

339. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (citing Lee, 605 N.E. 2d 493, 503); see
also Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (quoting Chambers, 64 S.W.3d 737, 744; See also Jones,
155 P.3d 9, 14-5.
340. City of Caddo Valley, 9 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Hill Constr. Co. v. Bragg,
725 S.W.2d at 540 (1987)) see also Ashley, 552 F.3d at 667.
341. Young, 812 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (citing Lee, 605 N.E.2d 493, 503).
342. Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d 110, 114.
343. Id. at 114; See also Jones, 155 P.3d 9, 14-15.
344. Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1152 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. 258, 269).
345. Id.
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enforcement, and treatment.346 Alleging that the defendants’ conduct of
manufacturing, marketing, and selling opioid-based drugs was the direct
and proximate cause of the harm suffered.347 Therefore, using the facts of
the case, a court should consider the sequence of events that lead to the
harm.
The sequence of events from manufacturing to the harm is provided
as follows:
(1) Defendants must receive FDA approval to manufacture
the medication.348
(2) Licensed providers place orders with manufacturers to
receive the medication.349
(3) Medication is packed and shipped to providers.350
(4) Medication is received by providers and inventoried.351
(5) The patient receives treatment by an individual
authorized to prescribe medication.352
(6) Although six may coincide with all steps, this event
represents marketing to doctors and consumers. All
marketing must be in accordance with FDA guidelines.353
(7) The patient picks up the prescription.
(8) The patient takes their medication. Hopefully, patients
take their medication based on the guidelines provided by
their doctor.
(9) The patient becomes addicted to their medication.
(10) The patient loses their job and become homeless or a
burden on their family.
(11) Oklahoma experiences increased costs of providing
healthcare, law enforcement, and other government
associated services that pertain to implementation,
enforcement, and treatment.354
346. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21.
347. Id. at 11.
348. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822 (West, 2018); see also, 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West 2018).
349. Laura Olson, How Does the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Work?, DATEX
https://www.datexcorp.com/how-does-the-pharmaceutical-supply-chain-work/. (last
visited Nov. 3. 2020).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Brian J. Kenny, Charles V. Preuss, Pharmacy Prescription Requirements,
STATPEARLS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538424/; see
also A Drug Supply Chain Example: From Supplier to Patient, FDA
https://www.fda.gov/media/81739/download.
353. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822 (West 2018); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West 2018).
354. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21.
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According to the above timeline, Oklahoma’s alleged injury is a
direct result of individuals that become addicted to opioid-based drugs and
not of the manufacturers. The injury alleged by Oklahoma is an indirect
result of their manufacturing, marketing, and selling of opioid-based drugs.
In contrast, however, private individuals that become addicted would, in
fact, have a direct injury that resulted from the defendants’ conduct.
Individuals, in contrast to municipalities, suffer direct harm from the
marketing and selling of opioid based drugs. In addition, individuals are
harmed by the doctors that prescribe the medication and the pharmacists
that sell it.
2. Defendants’ conduct was not the legal cause of Oklahoma’s injury.
Once cause in fact has been established, a court must determine if
the defendants’ conduct was the legal cause of the alleged injury by the
plaintiff.355 In contrast to cause in fact, legal cause “addresses the separate
issue of how far legal responsibility should extend for a party’s actions.”356
An individual is the legal cause of harm if their conduct “is a substantial
factor in producing the injury.”357 According to Young, “the proper inquiry
regarding legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability, in which we
ask whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a
likely result of his conduct.”358
In determining whether defendants were the legal cause, it is
beneficial to determine alternative causes of the alleged addiction.359
Possible harm may include pill mills, bad doctors, bad pharmacists, theft,
and misuse of prescribed medication. According to the opinion, the
proportion of costs associated with the defendants’ conduct is unknown.
Moreover, ascertaining the true impact of defendants’ conduct on
Oklahoma is difficult because there is no other conclusion to make other
than an increase in costs.
As to whether defendants conduct foreseeably caused the opioid
epidemic, that is unknown. There were two indications that defendants
became aware of their deceptive and incorrect marketing techniques.
355. Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (citing Callahan, 863 S.W. 2d 852,
856).
356. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (citing W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §
41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)).
357. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prod. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 103 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017) (citing Soule v. General Motors Corp, 882 P.2d 298, 311 (Cal.1994)).
358. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1086 (citing Lee, 605 N.E.2d 493, 503).
359. Note that a court should also consider all events, other than addiction, that
may have increased government costs. It is possible that the increased costs are the result
of multiple events or even events that are unknown.
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Nonetheless, defendants still maintained their federal and state required
certifications to continue producing said substances. Moreover, the doctors
still had the discretion to prescribe opioid-based drugs. With the
burdensome regulations, oversight, and reporting, a reasonable person may
not have foreseen the consequences. In hindsight, foreseeability is always
easy. However, in the moment, it is a different perspective. Therefore, it
is unlikely that defendants could have foreseen the additional costs that the
government would incur in the event of addicted patients. In contrast, it is
likely foreseeable that defendants could have foreseen harm to individuals
that become addicted. Therefore, because we are concerned with the harm
resulting from Oklahoma and not the individual level, the harm was not
foreseeable.360
In conclusion, although it is plausible that defendants’ conduct
interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to be addiction-free, defendants
were not the proximate cause of the harm. Therefore, defendants should
not be held liable under the doctrine of public nuisance.
V. COMPARING THE JUDGMENTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY WITHIN PUBLIC
NUISANCE
When comparing similar cases of product liability under the
doctrine of public nuisance, the distinctions almost become unnoticeable.
The court was wrong in holding defendants liable in State v. Purdue
Pharmaceuticals. In comparing public nuisance claims that involve
product liability, it is essential to distinguish the instant case from those in
the lead paint, cigarette, and firearm industry. The instant case is
distinguishable from those against lead paint manufacturers because lead
paint became illegal before the lawsuits brought against their
manufacturers. Therefore, the outcomes would likely not be comparable.
Moreover, the instant case, in contrast to cases against cigarette
manufacturers, a settlement has yet to be reached. Thus, the proceeding
section will analyze the facts and reasonings used in cases brought against
firearm manufacturers and to conclude as to the possible conclusions that
each court could reach.
If a court were to follow the rationale used in Ileto, then defendants,
in the instant case, would have likely escaped liability. First, the arguments
360. At this point, courts would typically consider defenses that a defendant
might have to limit liability for the nuisance. In response to a public nuisance suit, a
defendant may allege that their actions were authorized by law, the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, the plaintiff assumed the risk, the plaintiff came to the nuisance,
others contributed to the nuisance or that the injury was a result of an intervening cause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DEFENSES § 840 (D) – (E). (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
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made in Ileto and the instant case were almost identical. The instant case,
for example, argued that the defendants’ intentional false and misleading
dissemination of opioid prescriptions constituted a public nuisance under
Okla. Stat. Tit. 50 §1.361 Similarly, the plaintiffs, in Ileto, argued that
firearm manufacturers created a public nuisance with their promotion of
firearms.362 In addition, the harm alleged in both Ileto and the instant case
included increased costs regarding the health and safety of the public.363 In
Ileto, the court also found that interference by gun manufacturers
unreasonably interfered with a public right and that manufacturers were the
proximate cause of harm.364 However, in contrast to the instant case, the
manufacturers, in Ileto, were not held liable because their conduct was
statutorily approved.365 Therefore, if the instant case were to be heard in
front of the Ileto court, then the judgment would have likely favored
defendants.
If the court in Philadelphia were to hear the instant case, then the
outcome would have likely favored the defendants, but for a different
reason than in Ileto. Both Philadelphia and the instant case alleged
increased costs to the health and safety of the public in association with
government services.366
Although the court would have likely
acknowledged harm, the court would have found that defendants, in the
instant case, were not the proximate cause of the injuries alleged.367
In both Young and in the instant case, the courts would have at least
agreed that a public right does exist as to health and safety exists.368
However, the court in Young stated that harm arising from negligence, even
in a highly regulated industry, is likely to result in liability.369
Alternatively, the court may take into consideration the legislative intent
and reach a different conclusion.370 Nonetheless, if the court in Young were
to have heard the instant case, the conclusion would have likely favored

361. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1.
362. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 421
F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
363. Ileto, 349 F.3d 1191, 1211, dismissed, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. Cal.
2006) cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929 at * 18.
364. Ileto, 349 F.3d 1191, at 1212-14, dismissed, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D.
Cal. 2006)
365. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1304, dismissed, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
366. City of Philadelphia v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3rd Cir.
2002); cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *18.
367. Philadelphia, 277 F. 3d at 422.
368. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1084; cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929 at 12.
369. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1084.
370. Id. at 1091.

74

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39:1

defendants because they were not the proximate cause of the harm
alleged.371
At least on a motion to dismiss, like that in Gary ex rel. King, the
court would likely permit the complaint to stand.372 In addition, the harm
alleged in the instant case and in Gary Ex Rel. King was that harm resulted
in public health and safety which, in turn, lead to an increased cost in
government services.373 Therefore, at least on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the judge would likely not dismiss the case.
Furthermore, based on the rules stated in this case, a judge might also have,
similarly, held the defendants in the instant case liable.
AcuSport, in contrast, argued that manufacturers should have
limited the sale of firearms.374 Thus, a comparable argument would be that
defendants should have limited the sale of opioid-based drugs to the public.
Similarly, the instant case and AcuSport, alleged that harm was to public
health and safety.375 However, the court would have been unpersuaded by
this argument.376 The court would likely hold that defendants did not suffer
harm different in kind than the general public, and therefore, have no
standing.377
Likewise, if the court in Chicago were to hear the instant case, the
judgment would have likely favored the defendants. In Chicago, the
holding elaborated that a public right must be more than the general right
“not to be assaulted.”378 In the instant case, the judge would have likely
said that the right to be addiction-free is comparable. Therefore, the judge
would undoubtedly dismiss Oklahoma’s claim.
The arguments and the harm alleged in the instant case are far from
new or novel. In contrast, numerous cases have alleged harm that resulted
from the sale of legally manufactured goods that lead to increased costs
regarding government provided programs.379 In addition, previous courts
371. Id.
372. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222,
1242 (Ind. 2003).
373. City of Gary ex rel. King, 801 N.E. 2d at 1228; cf. Purdue, 2019 WL
4019929, at * 18.
374. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 446-7.
375. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 508 cf. State of Oklahoma v. Purdue
Pharmacy, 2019 WL 4019929, at *18.
376. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 497 (citing Callanan, 107 N.Y. 360,
370).
377. Id.
378. Chicago, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1116 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821 (B) cmt. g).
379. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222,
1228 (Ind. 2003); City of Philadelphia v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3rd
Cir. 2002); Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2003).
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that have heard similar arguments have failed to extend liability to
manufacturers. Therefore, judges should highly scrutinize the facts of a case
before attempting to further expand the traditional doctrine of public
nuisance to those involving product liability.
VI. IN THE MIND OF A JUDGE
The Judge in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals likely believes the
extension of public nuisance was appropriate under the circumstances. It
is clear that the Judge went with a broad definition of a public right and did
not find an issue concerning a lack of proximate cause. However, in his
opinion, the Judge disregarded the need to explain his extension of the
doctrine of public nuisance. Therefore, it is beneficial to speculate on the
potential rationale that might have led to the judgment.
First, regarding the public right to be addiction-free, the Judge
appears to have logically extended the definition under the doctrine public
nuisance. This is because the face of the Oklahoma public nuisance statute
nuisance, where it appears to permit a claim for public nuisance without a
public right affecting the entire public. However, in doing this the judge
disregarded possible consequences that could occur due to such a broad
definition of a public right.
Moreover, the harm experienced by Oklahoma from opioid-based
medication was significant from the increased costs, broken families, and
deaths. Living in Oklahoma, it could be tough to see the pain that occurs
within the community. The possible sympathy that arises from seeing
constant harm could lead a Judge to extend any doctrine of the law to assist
those harmed where the law was insufficient to remedy a wrong.
Another possibility is that defendants became a scapegoat for an
injury that the government played a role in. The government has approved
medications, approved drug screening, and regulates the pharmaceutical
industry. Therefore, the government is partially responsible for any harm
that occurs due to a lack of oversight or regulation.
In conclusion, the change in public perception, the public harm, and
the inability to remedy the situation under other legal theories, likely lead
the Judge to the ultimate conclusion in this case. However, the opinion
disregards the possible consequences of expanding the doctrine of public
nuisance to product liability. Therefore, the proceeding section discusses
the possible effects.
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VII. WHAT NEXT? POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULING IN State v.
Purdue Pharmaceuticals
The doctrine of public nuisance should be expanded in limited
instances to product manufacturers. Here, however, was not the proper
place for such an expansion. This expansion could have ripple effects across
the entire legal community. Generally speaking, the expansion of public
nuisance and a disregard of intervening causes could have disastrous results
for the doctrine and lead to a multitude of litigations. The expansion could
increase the overall number of public nuisance cases filed. Until the law
has further developed regarding the expansion, at least in the short term,
there will likely be an influx of cases brought against product manufacturers
where other doctrines have traditionally been insufficient. For example, it
might be possible to see food manufacturer liable for health consequences
that impact the entire community through an increased cost of insurance.
Due to the change in public perception, pharmaceutical companies
will likely settle similar to that of the tobacco industry. A settlement could
decrease overall costs to pharmaceutical companies by limiting damages,
attorneys’ fees, and future litigations by other states. With recent trends, a
settlement would likely be in the best interest of pharmaceutical companies.
Furthermore, even if courts were to find the defendants not liable, the
potential costs associated with litigation may outweigh the costs associated
with a settlement agreement.
The extension of public nuisance may not hold recourse for private
members of society that are harmed. The instant case was a suit brought by
a municipality and not a private party. Typically, courts decline class
actions in public nuisance claims for failure to have harm different than that
of the general public. Therefore, if an individual wished to bring a public
nuisance claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, it might be more
difficult regarding barriers to entry. First, the harm of a member in society
will likely be similar if not slightly different from others within society.
Second, even if an individual has suffered a harm different than that of the
general public, such as the death of a family member, the court will likely
dismiss the case. Although somehow disregarding these when considering
a municipality as a plaintiff, a court might base their conclusion on
intervening causes or contributory negligence. Moreover, a court could
make a distinction between the monetary harm at large felt by the
government and the harm on an individual level (even if such harm could
be the same on different magnitudes).
Furthermore, by allowing pharmaceutical manufacturers to be held
liable for the use of their medication by patients, whether lawfully used or
not, could lead manufacturers to withhold new medications that could
benefit society for fear of litigation. In addition, the pharmaceutical
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industry is already heavily regulated at the state and federal level. If a state
wished to deter pharmaceutical companies from certain conduct, then
additional legislation would be more feasible than extending common law
doctrines through the court system to remedy the harm.
The doctrine of public nuisance was incorrectly expanded to cover
this kind of consumer protection. The traditional consumer protection
doctrine failed to provide the necessary social and monetary incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to accurately promote, manufacture, and sell
their products. The holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceutical brought to
light a gap in the law where other legal theories have been insufficient to
hold product manufacturers liable for harm caused as a result of their false
and misleading marketing tactics. Therefore, the legislature should get
involved to extend consumer protection laws further.
In order to better protect consumers, Congress and state legislature
should enact statutes that require additional education on the side effects of
prescriptions, documents should be in layman terms, and the true risks
associated with addiction or the potential abuse labeled appropriately. In
addition, to avoid conflicts of interest, pharmaceutical companies should be
barred from providing educational classes, symposiums, or conferences
regarding any medication. Rather than pharmaceutical companies
educating doctors on what to prescribe, doctors should rely on their medical
school training and other credible sources in determining the best
prescriptions for their patients.
If the legislature fails to enact proper measures to account for this
gap in consumer protection and if a court believes that the extension has
gone too far, rather than litigate under the doctrine of public nuisance, the
doctrines of negligence, product liability, fraud, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and other doctrines directed at consumer protection
could be used against the manufacturers that contributed to the opioid
epidemic, especially if consumers wish to litigate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the conduct of the defendants was unethical and
questionable, the extension of public nuisance has gone too far from its
common-law roots. The holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals should
be reversed for extending beyond traditional parameters of public nuisance.
The doctrine of public nuisance is now another ground for consumers to
remedy an injury that occurs outside the control of manufacturers, even if
harm seems attenuated or remote from the control of the alleged tortfeasor.
In conclusion, the doctrine of public nuisances was incorrectly
extended to cover areas of consumer protection. In addition, the Judge
disregarded the traditional notions of public right and proximate cause
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within the doctrine of public nuisance. The Judge was likely persuaded by
the need to protect the public from harm along with the negative perception
towards the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, the true impact of the
extension has yet to be seen. Therefore, if the legislature has different
intentions for the pharmaceutical industry, then they should create statutes
that limit or indicate additional ways of shielding or holding
pharmaceuticals companies accountable for their manufacturing,
promoting, and selling of medications.
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Addiction is a serious public health issue. Addiction plagues
individuals, families, and communities. If you or someone you know is
suffering from addiction, reach out to your local doctor about possible
treatment or recovery plans.

